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Legal Financial Obligations: Fulfilling the Promise
of Gideon by Reducing the Burden
Travis Stearns*
I. INTRODUCTION
Gideon v. Wainwright established that no person charged with a crime
would be denied counsel because they1 could not afford to pay for an
*

Travis Stearns is the Deputy Director of the Washington Defender Association (WDA),
an advocacy, training, and resource agency for criminal defense attorneys. A graduate of
George Washington University, he has worked as a public defender for New York
County’s Legal Aid Society and the Whatcom County Public Defender. At WDA, he
works on substantive policy reform in the legislature and before the courts. He is
responsible for the development of a yearlong state-wide training program for public
defenders and frequently presents at conferences on issues relating to trial advocacy, the
right to counsel, and the impact of criminal convictions. He is an adjunct professor at
Seattle University School of Law where he teaches a seminar for criminal law externs.
He was awarded the "Golden Door" Award by Northwest Immigration Rights Project for
his work in redefining gross misdemeanors in Washington to 364 days.
1
“The use of they, their, them, and themselves as pronouns of indefinite gender and
indefinite number is well established in speech and writing, even in literary and formal
contexts.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2005).
English lacks a common-gender third person singular pronoun that can be used
to refer to indefinite pronouns (as everyone, anyone, someone). Writers and
speakers have supplied this lack by using the plural pronouns <and every one
to rest themselves betake — Shakespeare> <I would have everybody marry if
they can do it properly — Jane Austen> <it is too hideous for anyone in their
senses to buy — W. H. Auden>.
Id. “The use of an ostensibly plural pronoun such as they, them, themselves, or their with
a singular antecedent dates back at least to 1300, and over the years such constructions
have been used by many admired writers, including William Makepeace Thackeray ("A
person can't help their birth"), George Bernard Shaw ("To do a person in means to kill
them"), and Anne Morrow Lindbergh ("When you love someone you do not love them all
the time"). The practice is so widespread both in print and in speech that it generally
passes unnoticed. Forms of they are useful as gender-neutral substitutes for generic he
and for coordinate forms like his/her or his or her (which can sound clumsy, especially
when repeated frequently).” THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (5th ed. 2011).
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attorney.2 In State v. ANJ, the Washington State Supreme Court recognized
that “[t]he right of effective counsel and the right to review are fundamental
to, and implicit in, any meaningful modern concept of ordered liberty.”3 The
guarantee of counsel helps ensure systemic integrity and that the wrongfully
accused are not convicted of crimes that they did not commit. In
Washington, this right comes at a price. It includes mandatory assessments
that cannot be waived by a court, even where there is a finding of
indigency.4 In fact, many jurisdictions assess mandatory fees in order to
apply for an attorney and will charge a person with the cost of their public
defender once the case has been completed.5 This article examines the
disparity that the imposition of Legal Financial Obligations (LFOs)6 on
persons unable to pay them has created and argues that these disparities

2

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
State v. A.N.J., 225 P.3d 956, 959 (Wash. 2010).
4
See, e.g. WASH. REV. CODE Sec. 7.68.035 (2010) (Victim Penalty Assessment);
WASH REV. Code Sec. 43.43.7541 (DNA Collection Fee).
5
King County assesses a twenty-five dollar fee for each application. See How to Get an
Attorney, KING CNTY., http://www.kingcounty.gov/courts/OPD/Services/
ProvideAttorney.aspx (last visited Feb. 10, 2013). King County’s policy guarantees that
no person will be denied a public defender because they cannot pay the application fee.
Id. Those who are unable to pay are asked to sign a promissory note for the debt. Id.
Pierce County also assesses a twenty-five dollar fee. See How to Obtain a Public
Defender, PIERCE CNTY., http://www.co.pierce.wa.us/index.aspx?NID=754 (last visited
Feb. 10, 2013).
6
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.760 (2011). Whenever a person is convicted in Superior
Court, the court may order the payment of a legal financial obligation (LFO) as part of
the sentence. Id. The court must, on either the judgment and sentence or on a subsequent
order to pay, designate the total amount of a LFO and segregate this amount among the
separate assessments made for restitution, costs, fines, and other assessments required by
law. Id. On the same order, the court is also to set a sum that the offender is required to
pay on a monthly basis towards satisfying the legal financial obligation. Id. If the court
fails to set the offender monthly payment amount, the department shall set the amount if
the department has active supervision of the offender, otherwise the county clerk shall set
the amount. Id. Upon receipt of an offender's monthly payment, restitution shall be paid
prior to any payments of other monetary obligations. Id. After restitution is satisfied, the
county clerk shall distribute the payment proportionally among all other fines, costs, and
assessments imposed, unless otherwise ordered by the court. Id.
3
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impact the ability of the criminal justice system to impose fair and
meaningful penalties that hold persons accountable and reduce recidivism.
Along with incarceration and supervision, the fines, fees, and restitution
imposed in a sentence are some of the most significant and far reaching
consequences of a conviction.7 Once imposed, LFOs are hard to avoid, as
there are limited ways for the court to modify the amount a person owes,
even when that person is unable to pay for reasons beyond their control.
LFOs do not go away; they are not eligible for review in bankruptcy court,
interest is imposed on any debt outstanding at 12 percent,8 and jurisdictions
are able to impose collection fees.9
This article addresses why the LFO system is an unworkable system that
punishes poor persons not because of the crime that they have committed,
but because of their indigence. Section II examines what LFOs are and what
the obligations are that flow from their imposition. This section will look at
the disparities that arise because of the burdens placed on people unable to
pay their LFOs. It also considers some of the ways that attorneys who
represent poor persons can reduce the burden of LFOs on their clients.
Section III will address specific advocacy points lawyers can use in court to
ensure that LFOs are imposed only upon persons who have an ability to pay
them. Section IV will look at some of the methods by which courts can
reduce LFOs post-sentence, and how lawyers can help their clients avoid
incarceration for failure to pay. Section V will examine some of the changes
that must be made on a system-wide level, as the opportunities for advocacy
on an individual case are limited. In Section VI, the article will conclude by
7

Id.
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.82.090 (2011); WASH REV. CODE § 4.56.110 (2010); see also
WASH REV. CODE § 19.52.010 (2011).
9
Clark County imposes a hundred dollars per year collection fee if the LFOs are paid in
cash. See Superior Court Clerk’s Collections Unit, CLARK CNTY.,
http://www.clark.wa.gov/courts/clerk/lfo.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2013). LFOs paid by
credit are subject to at least a two-dollar collection fee. Id.
8
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arguing that change is required in the way LFOs are imposed and collected.
Requiring courts to impose LFOs in amounts that a person can actually pay
improves confidence in our courts and increases the likelihood that the
LFOs will actually be paid. To help fulfill the promise of Gideon—that all
persons will be treated fairly by our criminal justice system—defense
attorneys must provide effective advocacy, courts must impose evidence
based sentences that take into consideration the ability of defendants to pay
LFOs, and the legislature must reform laws that unfairly penalize persons
because of their indigence.

II. LEGAL FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS IN WASHINGTON
Whenever a person is sentenced for a crime in Washington, the sentence
will include LFOs.10 The court may impose over eighteen fees and fines on
a person convicted of a felony, plus restitution.11 Fines are penalties that
may be assessed as part of the sentence. Those commonly imposed include
the victim penalty assessment (VPA),12 court costs,13 drug funds,14
emergency response expenses,15 DNA collection fees,16 court-appointed

10
11
12

WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.760 (2011).
Id. § 9.94A.760(1).
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.99.080 (2004).
When any person is found guilty in any superior court of having committed a
crime, except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, there shall be
imposed by the court upon such convicted person a penalty assessment. The
assessment shall be in addition to any other penalty or fine imposed by law and
shall be five hundred dollars for each case or cause of action that includes one
or more convictions of a felony or gross misdemeanor and two hundred fifty
dollars for any case or cause of action that includes convictions of only one or
more misdemeanors.

Id.

13
14
15
16

WASH. REV. CODE § 10.73.160 (1995).
WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.401 (2012).
WASH. REV. CODE § 38.52.430 (2012).
WASH. REV. CODE § 43.43.7541 (2011).

THIRD ANNUAL PUBLIC DEFENSE CONFERENCE

Legal Financial Obligations 967

attorney fees,17 and costs of defense.18 Two of the most common, the $500
VPA and the $100 DNA collection fee, must be imposed in every case.19
The maximum fine that can be imposed is dependent upon the classification
of the crime and ranges from up to $50,000 for a class A Felony to $1,000
dollars for a misdemeanor.20 While most crimes have a general fine that
may be imposed, the court must impose specific fines for some offenses.21
From the time the court enters judgment, all LFOs begin accruing interest
at a 12 percent rate applicable to civil judgments.22 Interest may be reduced
or waived “only as an incentive for the offender to meet his or her legal
financial obligations.”23 Waiver requires a finding by the court that the
defendant has made a “good faith effort” to pay, and that the interest accrual
is causing a significant hardship.24 In addition to the fees and fines imposed
by the Court, the clerk may also charge a “collection fee” until LFOs are
collected in full.25

17

WASH. REV. CODE § 10.73.160 (1995).
Id.; see also WASH. REV. CODE § 43.43.7541 (2011); Wash. Ct. R.A.P. 14.2 (stating
that “[i]n a criminal case involving an indigent juvenile or adult offender, an award of
costs will apportion the money owed between the county and the State.”).
19
WASH. REV. CODE § 7.68.035 (2011); WASH. REV. CODE § 43.43.690 (1992).
20
The fine for a class A felony is up to $50,000, for a class B felony it is up to $20,000,
for a class C felony it is up to $10,000, for a gross misdemeanor it is up to $5,000, and for
a misdemeanor it is up to $1,000. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.20.021 (2011).
21
See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.88.120 (2012). Fines for prostitution offenses are
set from fifty dollars to $10,000. Id. Where the court finds that the offender does not have
the ability to pay the fee, the court may reduce the fee by up to two thirds of the
maximum allowable fee. Id. See also WASH. REV. CODE § 46.61.5055 (2012) (basing
fines for DUI offenses upon prior history, with a minimum for first offenders of no less
than $350).
22
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.82.090 (2011); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.56.110 (2010); see also
WASH. REV. CODE § 19.52.010 (2011).
23
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.82.090 (2011).
24
Id.
25
For example, Clark County imposes a hundred dollars a year collection fee if the
LFOs are paid in cash. See CLARK CNTY., supra note 9. LFOs paid by credit are subject
to at least a two dollar collection fee. Id.
18
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Restitution is ordered for conduct which results in an injury to person or
damage to property.26 It is intended to make the victim of the crime whole
and it is not imposed as punishment or as an attempt by the court to recoup
expenses.27 Restitution is based upon easily ascertainable damages for
injury to or loss of property, actual expenses incurred for the treatment of
injuries, lost wages resulting from any injuries, and the cost of counseling
reasonably related to the offense.28 Restitution may not be ordered for
intangible losses, including mental anguish or pain and suffering.29 While
generally thought of as mandatory, courts have the ability to order no
restitution where extraordinary circumstances make restitution
inappropriate.30 But unlike other LFOs, restitution may not be waived in a
modification hearing (a hearing that provides the opportunity for reduction
of payments or excusal of LFOs), even where there is evidence that the
defendant lacks the ability to pay the restitution.31 The court may reduce,
but not waive, the interest that accrues on restitution.32 Like all LFOs,
restitution is not dischargeable by filing for bankruptcy.33
The total amount of LFOs imposed on a person can be significant. The
most recent study of LFOs in Washington found that the median (typical)
value of fees and fines assessed per felony conviction in 2004 was $1,110
and that the mean (average) fee and fine assessed was $1,406.34 Convictions
involving nonviolent drug charges were associated with higher median fine
26

WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.753 (2003).
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.750 (2003).
28
Id. § 9.94A.753 (3).
29
Id.
30
Id. § 9.94A.753 (5).
31
Id. § 9.94A.753 (2).
32
WASH. REV. CODE . § 10.82.090 (2011).
33
Id. § 9.94A.753.
34
KATHERINE A. BECKETT ET AL., WASH. STATE MINORITY AND JUSTICE COMM., THE
ASSESSMENT AND CONSEQUENCES OF LEGAL FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS IN
WASHINGTON STATE 19 (2008), available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/committee
/pdf/2008LFO_report.pdf.
27
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and fee amounts than violent felonies.35 Three years post-sentencing, less
than 20 percent of the fees, fines, and restitution had been paid on roughly
three-quarters of the cases that were reviewed.36 This study also describes
the great difficulty that indigent persons have in paying back their LFOs,
even when they are assessed the average fees.37 Because of the high interest
charged, a person who makes payments on their LFOs of twenty-five
dollars a month, which is an amount many persons try to pay, will owe
more to the state five years after they were convicted than when the LFOs
were initially assessed.38 Thirty years later, that person will still owe
significant amounts to the state.39
Table 1. Average Amount Owed by Monthly Payment in Five, Ten,
Fifteen, and Thirty Years for Average LFO of $2,540

Debt: Five
Years
Debt: Ten
Years
Debt: Fifteen
Years
Debt: Thirty
Years

$10
Payment
3,798

$25
Payment
2,073

$50
Payment
531

6,083

2,623

10,234

2,740

Paid:
Seventy-Two
Months
0

56,362

3,938

0

$100
Payment
Paid: Thirty
Months
0
0
0

Note: The average (mean) LFO amount assessed by the Washington
Superior Courts in 2004 was $2,540. The calculations in this table are
based upon the current interest rate of 12 percent.40
35

Id.
Id. at 20.
37
Id.at 22.
38
Id. at 22.
39
Id. In reviewing imposed LFOs, Dr. Beckett found that 0 percent of the original LFOs
had been paid in over half of the convictions that she studied three years after they had
been imposed. Id.
40
Id.
36
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Once an offender is released from jail, they can apply for a waiver or
reduction of the interest that accrued while they were incarcerated for that
offense.41 In order to qualify for this waiver, the offender must show a
“significant hardship” and must have made at least fifteen payments during
an eighteen-month period.42 The interest on restitution may not be waived
and may only be reduced if the restitution principle is paid in full.43
The data in Washington shows that there are significant disparities across
the state in the imposition of LFOs, even within particular offense
categories.44 Factors that contribute to higher fine and fee assessment
include a person’s prior criminal history, whether the offense is drug related
(which results in significantly higher fines and fees), and whether a person
chooses to exercise their right to a trial (which also resulted in higher fines
and fees).45 The demographic makeup of the county also factors into the
amount of the fine. Counties with less population, higher violent crime
rates, and smaller fractions of their budgets spent on law and justice
assessed higher fines and fees.46 Latino and male defendants are assessed
higher fines and fees than other demographic groups.47 Scholars have found
that “it is clear that convicted defendants with similar legal histories and
conviction charges are assessed very different fees and fines depending
upon defendant gender, ethnicity, charge type, adjudication method, and the
county in which the case is adjudicated and sentenced.”48
41

WASH. REV. CODE. § 10.82.090(2) (2011).
Id. § 10.82.090(2)(c).
43
Id.
44
The median fines and fees imposed in King County is $600, while Clark and Whitman
counties impose median fines and fees of $2,170 and $7,049 respectively. BECKETT ET
AL., supra note 34, at 23.
45
Id. at 28.
46
Id. at 29.
47
Id. at 28. Latinos are more likely to live in poverty than white residents, making it
highly unlikely that this disparity reflects the fact that Latinos are in a better position to
pay LFOs than white defendants. Id. at 31.
48
Id. at 33.
42
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III. SENTENCE HEARING ADVOCACY: LIMITING THE IMPOSITION OF
LFOS
Collecting LFOs from a convicted person is only constitutional if the
state provides a mechanism by which an indigent defendant can obtain
relief from the debt.49 In Fuller v. Oregon, the court held as constitutional a
recoupment scheme that required an indigent defendant to repay the cost of
representation following conviction50 where the court made the obligation
“conditional” and based its finding upon the belief that there was a future
likelihood that the defendant would be able to make the payments.51 The
court made clear that “the obligation to repay the state accrues only to those
who later acquire the means to do so without hardship”52 and that “[t]hose
who remain indigent or for whom repayment would work ‘manifest
hardship’ are forever exempt from any obligation to repay.”53 A repayment
obligation may not be imposed if it appears that there is no likelihood that
the defendant’s indigence will end.54 These rules are especially important
when the court is considering imposing fees for recoupment of defense
costs since both Due Process and right to counsel issues are implicated.55
In preparing a strategy to advocate for lower LFOs, especially fines and
fees, courts should be educated on the ethnic and geographic disparities that
exist in the imposition of LFOs. The data is clear that these disparities exist,
49
Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 53–54 (1974); State v. Barklind, 557 P.2d 314, 317
(Wash. 1977).
50
Fuller, 417 U.S. at 54.
51
Id. at 46.
52
Id. at 46; Barklind, P.2d at 317 (noting that the recoupment order in that case
incorporated all of Fuller’s safeguards, including the ability to petition for remission and
to seek relief from the duty to make payments when the defendant lacked the present
financial ability to pay without causing undue hardships to himself or his dependents).
53
Fuller, 417 U.S. at 53.
54
See State v. Curry, 814 P.2d 1252, 1254 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991); aff’d, 829 P.2d 166
(Wash. 1992).
55
State v. Blank, 930 P.2d 1213, 1221 (Wash. 1997) (“A statute which imposes an
obligation to pay the costs of court appointed counsel … which lacks any procedure to
request a court for remission of payment violates due process.”).
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and courts in counties that impose higher fees should be informed of this
fact.56 It simply is not fair that a similarly situated defendant in one county
is assessed fines and fees that are more than seven times what a defendant
in another county is assessed,57 and courts should be brought to understand
these disparities.
Focusing on the impact that LFOs have on reentry into society may also
help persuade both the prosecutor and the court to agree that lower LFOs
are appropriate. In a study conducted to examine the impact on offenders
who had been released from prison but still owed LFOs, the data showed
that only 48 percent of the persons interviewed were employed at the time
of the interview, 26 percent had only a high school diploma or GED, 26
percent were living in unstable housing, and 58 percent were supporting
children.58 Research has consistently found that most people convicted of
felony crimes experience multiple forms of disadvantages that pre-date their
criminal conviction, including comparatively low levels of educational
attainment, high rates of unemployment, and limited incomes.59 Nationally,
nearly 60 percent of all jail inmates report pre-arrest incomes of under
$1,000 a month.60 Nearly four out of five people charged with a crime are
eligible for a public defender.61 With all indigent clients, there is no

56

BECKETT ET AL., supra note 34 at 29.
Id., at 23 (“At the low end, the median fee and fine amount assessed was $600 in King
County. By contrast, in Clark and Whitman counties, the median fee and fine amounts
assessed were $2,170 and $7.049.”).
58
Id. at 36.
59
Id. at 38 (citing Becky Petit and Bruce Western, Mass Imprisonment and the Life
Course: Race and Class Inequality in U.S. Incarceration, 69 AM. SOC. REV. 151 (2004);
BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA (2006)).
60
Id. (citing BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA (2006)).
61
KATE TAYLOR, JUSTICE POLICY INST. , SYSTEM OVERLOAD: THE COSTS OF UNDERRESOURCING PUBLIC DEFENDERS (2011), available at http://www.justicepolicy.org
/research/2756/system_overload_final.pdf (citing Scott Wallace & David Carroll,
Implementation and Impact of Indigent Defense Standards, 31 S.U.L. REV.245 (2004)).
57
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question that a criminal conviction and incarceration makes a challenging
life even more difficult.62
Table 2. LFO Interview Sample: Social and Financial Characteristics
(Percent of Persons Interviewed) 63
Employed (full or part time)

48

Less than a high school education

26

High School or GED only

40

Unstable housing/homeless

26

Supporting children

58

On community supervision

60

Formerly incarcerated

100

For many persons returning from incarceration, re-entry comes with
many challenges beyond LFOs. Between 15 and 27 percent of those who
leave prison or jail are released to a homeless shelter.64 Many will need drug
or alcohol treatment upon their release as well.65 In fact, up to 60 percent of
those released from prison will be unemployed a year later.66 Because
correctional facilities end rehabilitative programs while a person is still
62

ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS,
MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN
MISDEMEANOR COURTS 12 (2009), available at http:// www.nacdl.org /public.nsf
/defenseupdates/misdemeanor/$FILE/Report.pdf.
63
BECKETT ET AL., supra note 34, at 37.
64
42 U.S.C. § 17501(b)(9) (2012).
65
Id. § 17501(b)(10), (12).
66
Id. § 17501(b)(18).
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incarcerated, the disadvantages a person experiences upon release are even
more acute.67
Providing courts with this information may help them understand why
they should limit which LFOs they impose. In preparing their study on
LFOs for Washington Court’s Minority and Justice Commission, Drs.
Beckett and Harris interviewed a great number of persons who had
outstanding LFO debt. These interviews indicated that “LFOs exacerbate
the many difficulties with the re-entry process.”68 Dr. Harris further found
that the burden of legal debt drains income from families who are already
indigent and creates financial stress.69 It restricts opportunities and limits
access to status affirming institutions such as housing, education, and
economic markets and forces families “to choose between food, medicine,
rent, child support, and legal debt.”70 When a person is unable to pay their
debt, it can result in criminal sanctions, which may include warrants,
arrests, and incarceration.71 As a result, the burden of economic punishment
constrains “daily lives and future life chances” and can lead to increased
recidivism.72
Attorneys should be aware of opportunities for persons suffering from
mental illness. A person who is mentally ill may be able to seek waiver of
all LFOs other than restitution and the VPA.73 Before imposing any LFOs
upon a defendant who suffers from a mental health condition, the court
67
Stacey Mulick, Budget Proposal Would Trim Prison, Supervision Time For Many
Offenders, The Olympian, Dec. 6, 2011, http://www.theolympian.com /2011/12/
06/1902912/corrections-braces-for-more-cuts.html. “I have nothing to refer [parolees]
to,” [Community Corrections Officer Robin] McLaughlin said. “They just keep getting
whittled down and whittled down.” Id.
68
BECKETT, supra note 34, at 73.
69
Alexes Harris et al., Drawing Blood from Stones: Legal Debt and Social Inequality in
the Contemporary United States, 115 AM. J. SOC. 1753, 1777 (2010).
70
Id. at 1785.
71
Id. at 1777.
72
Id.
73
See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.777 (2010).
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must first determine that the defendant has the means to pay such additional
sums.74 Where the court finds the person suffers from a mental health
condition that prevents that person from participating in gainful
employment—as evidenced by a determination of mental disability based
upon enrollment in a public assistance program, a record of involuntary
hospitalization, or a competent expert evaluation—the court should not
impose additional LFOs.75 Attorneys representing clients who have such
conditions should document this in their pre-sentence reports and prevent
the imposition of additional LFO’s at sentencing.
Absent the clear exceptions for those who suffer from mental illness,76 it
may be very difficult to meet the standard for exemption articulated in
Fuller—that the imposition of LFOs will create a “manifest hardship.”77
Still, showing a court that a client is unlikely to be able to pay significant
LFOs, and that poor persons generally are unable to pay significant LFOs,
is a good strategy to reduce what LFOs are imposed on a client.
Demonstrating that a person would be able to pay their fines and fees if they
are set at a rate that person could afford and within a reasonable timeframe
may actually increase the likelihood these payments would be collected.78
Ensuring that a person could pay off their debt at some future point makes it
more likely that they will be able to pay their debt and may even increase
the likelihood that they will not reoffend.

IV. POST SENTENCING ADVOCACY: REMISSION AND
INCARCERATION FOR FAILURE TO PAY
The ability to seek relief from LFOs because of the inability to pay has
been extremely limited by the courts. Washington’s statutorily defined debt74
75
76
77
78

Id. § 9.94A.777(1).
See id. § 9.94A.777(2).
See id.
Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 46 (1977).
BECKETT ET AL., supra note 34, at 73.
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relief mechanism promises a person who owes LFOs that a reduction or
waiver is possible upon a showing of proof that the debt is causing a
“manifest hardship.”79 A remission petition to reduce LFO payments may
be filed “at any time.”80 Despite these promises, Washington courts have
denied requests for remission until “sanctions are sought for nonpayment.”81 Although other divisions have not followed this approach,
Division One of the Washington Court of Appeals has denied modification
requests on ripeness grounds in the two most recent unpublished cases that
have addressed this issue.82 Advocates should continue to challenge the
failure of sentencing courts to make findings of future ability to pay until it
is addressed by the Supreme Court.
Failure to pay LFOs can result in imprisonment, but courts have held it is
fundamentally unfair to imprison a person solely because that person lacks
the resources to pay their LFOs.83 Instead, Due Process requires that the
court determine whether the defendant has made all efforts to pay the fine
and yet cannot do so through no fault of that person.84 If a person is capable
of paying, but willfully refuses to do so, or does not “make sufficient bona
fide efforts to seek employment or borrow money in order pay,” the court
79

WASH. REV. CODE § 10.01.160(4) (2010).
Id., But see State v. Nash, No. 38514-7-II, 2011 WL 198695, at 4 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan.
6, 2011) (holding that defendant’s motion to remit LFOs was not ripe for review because
he had not shown that the Department of Corrections had required him to make payments
on his outstanding LFOs).
81
State v. Blank, 930 P.2d 1213, 1219–20 (Wash. 1997).
82
See State v. Manson not reported in P.3d (2012) (trial court is not required to enter
findings regarding a defendant’s ability to pay before it orders the defendant to pay
financial obligations); Nash, 2011 WL 198695, at 4 (remission not ripe for review until
sanctions are sought for non-payment); see also State v. Ziegenfuss, 74 P.3d 1205 (Wash.
Ct. App. 2003); cf, State v. Bertrand, 267 P.3d 511, 516–17 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011).
83
Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672–73 (1983); see also Williams v. Illinois, 399
U.S. 235, 242 (1970).
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See Bearden, 461 U.S. at 672; see also Smith v. Whatcom County. Dist. Court, 52
P.3d 485, 493 (Wash. 2002) (holding that the court must find that “a defendant’s failure
to pay a fine is intentional before remedial sanctions can be imposed”).
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may imprison the offender for failing to pay their LFO.85 While the burden
is upon the state to demonstrate that the defendant has not paid his or her
LFOs, the defendant must demonstrate that the failure to pay was not willful
once that burden has been met.86
Demonstrating the failure to pay was not willful may be a challenge that
requires strong advocacy. In State v. Nason, the defendant was ordered to
pay $735, which consisted of the VPA ($500), court costs ($110), and
attorney fees ($125).87 In the hearing on appeal, Mr. Nason asserted that he
was “homeless, unemployed and could not pay his LFO.”88 The court
rejected his arguments and agreed with the state that these facts did not
excuse his failure to pay his fines and fees. The court found that Mr. Nason
was willful in failing to pay his LFOs and ultimately sanctioned him to 120
days in jail.89 While the Supreme Court found that Spokane’s procedure
prior to imposing this incarceration violated Due Process, the Court of
Appeals did not find this procedure problematic, demonstrating the
difficulty attorneys will have making arguments for relief.90 Many of the
arguments that can be made when arguing LFOs should not be imposed are
appropriate to make when the state is seeking to sanction a person for
failure to pay. Unfortunately, Washington trial courts have not been
sympathetic to these arguments and have been hesitant to find that failure to
pay is not willful.91 The reluctance of courts to even address the issue until
85

State v. Nason, 233 P.3d 848, 851 (Wash. 2010) (quoting Bearden, 461 U.S. at 668).
See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94B.040(3)(b)-(c) (2002); see also Smith, 52 P.3d at 492;
State v. Bower, 823 P.2d 1171, 1173–74 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (“Poverty does not
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Nason, 233 P.3d at 849.
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Id. at 850.
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Nason, 192 P.3d 386, 392 (Wash. App. Ct. 2008), rev’d, 233 P.3d 848 (Wash. 2010).
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the state is seeking sanctions demonstrates why it is so important to make a
strong record when LFOs are initially imposed.

V. SYSTEMIC ADVOCACY: THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE CHANGE
Along with advocacy for individual cases, reducing the impact of LFOs
on indigent persons requires systemic reform—some of the changes that are
necessary to improve reentry and to reduce disparity and disproportionality
can come only through individual casework. Studies have found that “in the
rush to collect fines and fees, made all the more intense by the fiscal crises
in many states, no one is considering the ways in which the resulting debt
can undermine reentry prospects, pave the way back to prison or jail, and
result in yet more costs to the public.”92 Examining the impact of LFOs on
indigent persons can improve the criminal justice system, potentially
increase the ability of jurisdictions to collect the fees that are imposed, and
reduce the likelihood a person will return to custody.
Specifically, lawmakers should evaluate the total debt burden of existing
fees before adding new fees or increasing fee amounts.93 In 2011,
Washington imposed a new LFO for offenders who were convicted of
prostitution related offenses.94 While this new fine provided the ability of
indigent persons to waive two-thirds of the fine upon a finding of indigence,
one-third of the fine may not be waived regardless of whether there is a
current or future ability to pay.95 Likewise, the minimum fine a person

to pay and without making of finding of his willful failure to pay); see also Nason, 233
P.3d at 850–51(holding that Spokane’s “auto-jail” policy violated defendant’s due
process right to hearing on whether failure to pay was willful).
92
ALICIA BANNON, ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A
BARRIER TO REENTRY 1 (2010), available at http://brennan.3cdn.net
/c610802495d901dac3_76m6vqhpy.pdf.
93
Id. at 11.
94
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.88.120 (2012).
95
Id.
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convicted of a felony in Washington must pay upon conviction is $600,
none of which may be waived.96
Instead, Washington should consider adopting a model like
Massachusetts. Before the imposition of fees, Massachusetts requires an
initial investigation of the revenue that could be generated, the cost of
administering and collecting the fee, and the impact of the fee on affected
persons.97 An alternative to financial penalties would be to require
community service for able-bodied persons who are unemployed and not
able to pay fines and fees.
Reforming the way that LFOs are imposed and collected also requires
examining the way that collection fees and other collection efforts are
imposed. In addition to the LFOs imposed by the court, counties are able to
charge collection fees for outstanding LFOs.98 No standards are provided in
RCW 9.94A.760, which authorizes the imposition of LFOs, to measure the
impact of the debt on the former offenders, their families, or their
communities.99 In fact, no system exists to track LFOs and other
outstanding legal debt in Washington, meaning that if a person owes LFOs
on more than one case, they likely will be under an enormous burden with
no real way to mitigate its effect. Indigent defendants should be exempt
from user fees and payment plan fees, and other debt collection efforts
should be tailored to an individual’s ability to pay.100
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WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.760 (2011). While it is beyond the scope of this article to
address, this statute and the statute regarding a minimum fine for a prostitution offense
raise substantial constitutional questions when applied to indigent persons as mandatory
fines that have no way of being excused ignores Fuller’s requirements that an order to
pay be “conditional” upon a finding that there is a future likelihood that the defendant
would be able to make the payments. See id, see also, Fuller, 417 U.S. at 53-54.
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Id.
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Table 3
Common Collection Practices
Probation or parole officers monitor
payments.
Debtor must attend regular meetings
before a judge, clerk, or other collection
official.
Incarceration for failure to pay.

Refer debt to private collection agencies.
Probation terms extended for failure to
pay.
Driver’s license suspended for failure to
pay.
Debt converted to a civil judgment.
Wage garnishment and tax rebate
interception.

Hidden Costs
Salary and overtime. Officers distracted
from role in supporting reentry and
rehabilitation.
Salary and overtime. Burdened court
dockets.
Salary and overtime for judges,
prosecutors, and public defenders. Cost of
incarceration. Jail overcrowding. Lost jobs
and housing. Difficulty paying child
support.
Onerous collection fees, leading to
spiraling debt. Damaged credit, which
hurts housing and employment prospects.
Probation officer salary and overtime.
Increased risk of re-incarceration for
violating probation requirements.
Challenges in finding and maintaining
employment. Increased risk of reincarceration for driving with a suspended
license.
Damaged credit, which hurts housing and
employment prospects.
Individuals discouraged from seeking
legitimate employment. Financial hardship
and inability to meet child support
commitments.

Source: Bannon, Criminal Justice Debt: A Barrier to Reentry, 11.
Eliminating these fees and plans could also eliminate the variation
associated with their imposition, including “defendant ethnicity,
adjudication method, conviction type, and county characteristics.”101 In fact,
it is possible that if LFO payments were made more manageable and
achievable, jurisdictions might realize increased revenues. Public defender
101

BECKETT ET AL., supra note 34 at 76.

THIRD ANNUAL PUBLIC DEFENSE CONFERENCE

Legal Financial Obligations 981

fees should be eliminated to reduce pressures that can lead to the conviction
of the innocent, over-incarceration, and violations of the Constitution.102
The American Bar Association recommends individuals should not be
ordered to pay fees they are unable to afford, and that states should abolish
reimbursement fees that require defendants to reimburse the state for all or
part of the defender’s services.103 The ABA recommends that no such fees
should be imposed without the procedural safeguards established by Fuller,
which would require that a court inquire into a “defendant’s financial
resources and the burden that will be imposed in determining the amount
and method of payment.”104 Washington does not follow this model and, in
some counties, defendants may be assessed this fee twice: once by the
courts and once by the Office of Assigned Counsel.105 Instead, Washington
courts have affirmed the imposition of attorney fees, finding that it only
discourages the constitutional right to counsel where the fee was required as
a precondition to initial appointment or when imposed regardless of the
offender’s ability to pay.106 More than any other fee, these fees have the
potential to chill the right to counsel—defendants may be dissuaded from
applying for counsel because they know that they will be liable for the cost
of counsel when their cases are resolved. This is especially acute in
prosecution of minor crimes that are not likely to result in incarceration, but
where a lawyer can properly advise the client regarding the impact of the
conviction.107 In many of these courts, accused persons are not represented
102

BANNON ET AL., supra note 92, at 32.
AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA GUIDELINES ON CONTRIBUTION FEES FOR COSTS OF COUNSEL
IN CRIMINAL CASES 1 (2004), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content
/dam/aba/migrated/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/rec110.authcheckdam
.pdf.
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Lafler v. Cooper, --- U.S. ---, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 182 L. Ed. 2d 398 (2012); Missouri v.
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by counsel during preliminary hearings where pleas may take place.108 This
makes the assessment of fees without a proper hearing even more troubling.
Washington and other states should immediately cease incarcerating and
jailing individuals for failure to pay criminal justice debt, particularly before
a court has made an ability to pay determination.109 In their study on the
impact of LFOs in Washington, Beckett and Harris stated that “it is unclear
[whether] the goals of the legislation that regulates LFOs are being met.”110
In examining this issue, they determined that the goals of uniformity,
accountability, and recoupment were not being achieved.111 The fact that
Latino defendants, defendants charged with drug crimes, and defendants
whose cases move forward to trial are assessed significantly higher fees
should be a concern for any policy maker or court when considering
whether to impose non-mandatory fees.112 While Spokane County’s “autojail” policy was perhaps the worst example of disregarding the Due Process
rules laid out in Fuller, it is not the only example of persons being
incarcerated in Washington for failing to pay LFOs.113 Instead, courts
should make true inquiries into a person’s ability to pay, taking into account
their current circumstances and other obligations. Developing an integrated
system that can balance which debts are owed, and prioritize the ability of a
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person to pay, should result in reduced court time and time spent in jail,
which may also have an impact on recidivism.114
Recognizing that in many cases poor persons are unable to pay LFOs
may lead jurisdictions to create alternatives, and these programs should be
encouraged by the state. For example, the city of Spokane has created a
relicensing program for drivers who have not paid their traffic
infractions.115 Designed to remove a large segment of low-level crimes from
criminal dockets, this program has reduced the caseload of public
defenders, expedited time to disposition, and eliminated jail stays by DWLS
3 offenders.116 This method of restorative justice has resulted in reduced
caseloads for public defenders and prosecutors, increased city revenues, and
increased relicensing.117 Continuing to enable programs like this, and other
options that allow for alternatives to incarceration, are a proactive way to
eliminate the poverty penalty associated with debt repayment. Washington
should adopt a statewide model that mirrors the city of Spokane’s policies,
which, in the end, can realize improved efficiencies for the system and
reduce the burden of debt upon the poor.

VI. CONCLUSION
Creating a criminal justice system that does not discriminate against a
person because they are too poor to defend themselves helps ensure justice
and increases respect for the courts. Although the promise that a person
114
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would not be denied counsel because they could not pay for that lawyer was
made by the Supreme Court fifty years ago,118 the criminal justice system is
still trying to fulfill that promise.
One of the ways in which the system has not yet achieved the promise of
Gideon is in the imposition of fines and fees. While LFOs may seem minor
to persons who have an ability to pay them and insignificant compared to
some of the other consequences that can be imposed on a person who
commits a crime, the impact of LFOs can be just as serious as incarceration
and the loss of other rights.
Building a system that fulfills the promise of Gideon requires that a court
make a meaningful inquiry into a person’s ability to pay the LFOs imposed
in a case. A court must assess whether a person actually has a future ability
to pay, and when that person comes before the court for failing to pay the
LFOs, the court must make a true assessment into whether that failure to
pay is actually willful. In many cases, courts are not conducting that inquiry
in a meaningful way. Courts must be educated on the impact of LFOs and
why their blanket imposition is not improving judicial integrity and may, in
fact, result in increased disenfranchisement and recidivism. Attorneys
should make every effort to dissuade sentencing judges and revocation
hearing judges from ordering indigent clients to pay fines and fees that
these clients simply are not able to pay because of their poverty.
Because courts have limited the ways in which attorneys can ensure that
their clients will not be incarcerated because they are poor, it is necessary
that the legislature reexamine the wisdom of the current system of LFO
imposition. A workable system requires that the legislature examine the
impact that current and future LFOs will have on a person ordered to pay
the fines. The legislature must also determine whether the system is likely
to ever recover the fines imposed and whether there are better alternatives to
118
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imposed LFOs. Eliminating fees and fines directly related to the right to
counsel would improve the integrity of the system by ensuring more people
are represented by counsel. It may also improve efficiency by ensuring a
judge sees persons quickly, and that a judge imposes proper punishment,
taking into consideration whether a person can actually pay the fees and
fines imposed. Systemic change should also encourage the creation of
programs like those in Spokane, which have realized enormous cost savings
for the city and have also seen an increase in law abiding activity by
ensuring that all persons who participate successfully in the program will
again be able to drive lawfully.
The principle underlying Gideon, and all other due process principles, is
that a person who is charged with an offense will be treated fairly. Imposing
fees and fines that a person will never be able to pay does not improve
judicial integrity. Instead, it increases the likelihood a person who found
themselves in the criminal justice system for a minor crime will continue to
remain there, unable to discharge the LFOs that were imposed in their case.
Advocating for reduced LFOs where a client cannot pay them, helping to
ensure that only persons who willfully fail to pay are punished for not
paying, and reforming the way that LFOs are imposed in the first place need
to be priorities for all of those involved in criminal justice.
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